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INTRODUCTION
The Arrow Debreu McKenzie model of exchange under perfect competition is formulated in terms of a finite set of agents taking prices as given and engaging in the sale and purchase of a finite number of commodities (Arrow and Debreu [3] , McKenzie [30] , Debreu [11] ). This formulation, though at times technically convenient, raises conceptual difficulties. For example, a finite number of agents should mean that individuals are able to exercise some influence and that the assumption of price taking behavior is nonsensical. Furthermore, a finite number of commodities postulates a predetermined termination date beyond which all economic activity ceases and a predetermined finite set of uncertain states of the world. It also excludes the many important models of general equilibrium that are set in infinite dimensional commodity spaces.
In his classical papers, Aumann [4, 5] suggested that the appropriate model for perfectly competitive markets is one with a continuum of traders. The insignificance of individual traders is thus captured by the idea of a set with zero measure. Furthermore, summation or aggregation is generalized by the notion of the Lebesgue integral. Aumann also showed that the set of core allocations in his model coincide with the set of Walrasian allocations, which in turn is not empty (see also Hildenbrand's classical book [19] ).
Since it is impossible to integrate functions that are not measurable the class of``admissible'' allocations in Aumann's model is restricted to that of measurable functions. Thus, Walrasian allocations, Pareto improvements, and the improving allocations that can be considered by blocking coalitions must all be measurable. This restriction, however, seems innocuous when there is a finite number of commodities and Aumann's measurability assumption on preferences is satisfied. In the main this paper is concerned with Aumann's model when there are infinitely many commodities. It shows that when the commodity space is very large this restriction may be so severe that it renders Aumann's [4, 5] theorems false. The paper solves an open question which appears to have first been posed by Mertens who writes:`I f I remember correctly that conversation with Aumann, he was stressing the importance of going beyond the separable case (strong measurability), to check really whether equivalence did depend on there being many more agents than commodities.'' [31, Footnote 2, p. 189] Though the Lebesgue integral is a finite dimensional integral it has a straightforward infinite dimensional abstraction termed the Bochner integral (see Dunford and Schwartz [14] , Diestel and Uhl [12] , Yannelis [45] ). Indeed, the Bochner integral has been used to generalize Aumann's core equivalence theorem and to prove the existence of equilibrium in various infinite dimensional gener equilibrium and game theoretic models. Moreover, in sharp contrast to other more general integrals, 3 the Bochner integral retains a most elementary property of economic feasibility: net trades associated with feasible allocations cannot be positive and non-zero for every consumer (see Section 10) . This paper, however, provides a class of counter examples which show that if aggregation is generalized by the Bochner integral then the core equivalence result of Aumann [4] and the existence of equilibrium result of Aumann [5] do not hold in non-separable infinite dimensional commodity spaces. 4 We show that for an arbitrary atomless measure space of agents there is a fixed non-separable infinite dimensional commodity space in which one can construct an economy that satisfies all the desirable assumptions but which has no equilibrium, a core allocation that is not Walrasian, and a Pareto efficient allocation that is not a valuation equilibrium. By desirable assumptions we mean those assumptions which guarantee that these results hold in the finite dimensional setting as well as in the separable infinite dimensional setting:
1. The positive cone of the commodity space has a non-empty interior.
2. Initial endowments are strictly positive.
3. Consumption sets are the positive cone of the commodity space. 5. Preferences satisfy Aumann's measurability assumption: If x and y are strongly measurable allocations then the set of agents that prefer x over y is measurable.
It is well understood that what drives the results of Aumann is the requirement that the space of agents be atomless. When the number of commodities is finite this requirement underscores the``hidden'' assumption that the economy has``many more'' agents than commodities. This paper shows that Aumann's classical existence and equivalence theorems depend on there being many more agents than commodities.
When the number of commodities is finite Aumann's``hidden'' assumption has two important manifestations. First, Lyapunov's convexity theorem, which guarantees that the integral of set-valued functions is closed and convex.
MARKETS WITH MANY COMMODITIES
Second, the various measurable selection results that are due to thè`a bundance'' of strongly measurable functions from the space of agents into the commodity space which ensure that strongly measurable functions are rich enough abstractions of perfectly competitive allocations. Both of these manifestations can fail in infinite dimensional settings, albeit for two very different reasons. Lyapunov's convexity theorem depends on the topolinear relationship between the commodity space and the space of essentially bounded measurable functionals. 6 It may fail even when the commodity space is separable, see Diestel and Uhl [12, p. 265] or Yannelis [45, p. 24] . However, the abundance of strongly measurable functions is a topological property that is inherited by separable metrizable commodity spaces. 7 The main example in this paper is set in commodity-measure space pairs that display an``acute scarcity'' of strongly measurable functions.
It is impossible to Bochner integrate a function unless that function is strongly measurable and can be essentially approximated by a sequence of step functions. Thus, a purely technical consequence of adopting the Bochner integral is that feasible allocations must be strongly measurable and that coalitions can only consider those improvements that are strongly measurable. We identify the source of the failure of existence of equilibrium and the failure of core equivalence as this technical requirement of strong measurability. 8 In large spaces, this restriction makes the core large since there may not be any strongly measurable improvements even though there are many weakly measurable strict improvements. It also makes the set of Walrasian allocations small. In our example, there exists a Pettis integrable only weakly measurable Walrasian allocation, even though there are no strongly measurable equilibria.
Technically, the argument goes as follows. Suppose that the set of consumers is the continuum [0, 1]. We consider the non-separable Hilbert space l 2 ([0, 1]) (see Section 2 for definition). Here [0, 1] may be interpreted as the set of commodities. We define an ordering on l 2 ([0, 1]) and an economy that satisfies the desired assumptions. In this economy each consumer t # [0, 1] extremely desires the commodity t. We note, however, that measurable allocations have the property that almost every consumer is allocated zero of every commodity in a fixed set of full measure, see Proposition 8.2. This property, which has no analogue in the separable 192 TOURKY AND YANNELIS 6 Lyapunov's convexity theorem holds if for each coalition the cardinality of the family of distinct sub-coalitions is larger than the dimension of the commodity space, see Sections 7.
7 We see from the proofs in Rustichini and Yannelis [38] that the Aumann core equivalence result can be proven without regard to whether or not the exact version of Lyapunov's convexity theorem holds. Thus, Rustichini and Yannelis' generalization of the Aumann core equivalence theorem to separable infinite dimensional spaces seems to inherit the``hidden'' assumption of Aumann. 8 See also the discussion in Mertens [31] on the importance of measurability. spaces l n 2 and l 2 , is the source of the failure of both existence of equilibrium and core equivalence. The property could be interpreted as saying that, in our non-separable setting, strong measurability makes it seem as though there are many more commodities than agents hence violating Aumann's`h idden'' assumption and that strong measurability necessitates that consumer choices be closely correlated no matter the prevailing prices.
To establish that our economy does not have a price equilibrium we show that if f : [0, 1] Ä l 2 ([0, 1]) is a strongly measurable Walrasian allocation, with an equilibrium price p, then there must be some t # [0, 1] with the following contradictory properties:
1. The value of commodity t under p is zero.
2. Consumer t consumes zero of commodity t. 3. f (t) maximizes consumer t's utility subject to the budget constraint.
To show core-Walras non-equivalence we identify an allocation and show that any improvement upon this allocation has the following property:
There is some non-negligible coalition S$ # [0, 1] such that each consumer t # S$ must be allocated a strictly positive amount of the commodity t.
Such improvements cannot be essentially separably valued and thus cannot be strongly measurable. Therefore, this allocation cannot be improved upon by any coalition and is in the core. This is the case even though the allocation is not a Walrasian equilibrium and there would have been many improvements had we considered the more general Pettis integral.
The negative results in this paper points to the insight that Aumann's measurability assumption is far less restrictive in the non-separable setting than it is in the separable setting. Indeed, because of the``scarcity'' of strongly measurable allocations it is almost superfluously satisfied in our example. We emphasize this insight by first showing that one cannot hope to prove core equivalence without some measurability assumption on preferences, even in the finite dimensional setting. We then strengthen Aumann's measurability assumption and prove a positive equivalence result for Bochner economies in non-separable commodity spaces.
The lack of atomic coalitions is crucial for Aumann's proof of core equivalence. However, every non-atomic measure space admits a nonmeasurable atom: A non-measurable set that does not contain non-negligible measurable subsets (see Section 4). In separable commodity spaces, the role of Aumann's measurability assumption in the proof of core equivalence is to negate the effects of such non-measurable atoms. We strengthen that role and assume the following technical assumption:
Suppose that the commodity space has a base with cardinality m. There is a family of coalitions I with the property that the union of m null sets in I is a null set. Moreover, if x~is a core allocation, t [ e t is the endowments mapping, and z is an arbitrary commodity bundle then the set of agents that prefer t [ e t +z over x~is not only measurable but is also in I.
This strengthened measurability assumption is adequately onerous in large spaces;
9 it is also implied by Aumann's measurability assumption when the commodity space is separable. Consequently our positive theorem implies Aumann's classical equivalence result as well as the related infinite dimensional theorem of Rustichini and Yannelis [38] .
It should be noted that existence of an equilibrium and core equivalence results with a continuum of agents in non-separable Banach commodity spaces are already available in the literature. For example, for the commodity space L 10 (see Bewley [8, 9] , Mertens [31] , Noguchi [32] , Podczeck [35] ) and the commodity space M (0) 11 (see for example Mas-Colell [29] ). However, the space L in these results is endowed with the Mackey-(L , L 1 ) topology which is metrizable and separable. Moreover, the weak-(M(0), C(0)) topology of the the closed unit ball of M(0) is metrizable and separable. Therefore these positive results preserve Aumann's``hidden'' assumption. In particular, the usual measurable selection theorems hold in such settings.
Our counter examples indicate that once this``hidden'' assumption is violated existence of an equilibrium and core-equivalence fail. Indeed, a corollary of our main result states that for any choice of atomless measure space of agents and any non-separable Hilbert commodity space there is an economy that satisfies all the desirable assumptions but which has no equilibrium, a core allocation that is not Walrasian, and a Pareto efficient allocation that is not a valuation equilibrium. Non-separable Hilbert commodity spaces arise in models of asset trade under uncertainty (e.g., Khan and Sun [22] ). When the sample space of uncertain states is not separable, the space of all asset returns with finite variance is a non-separable Hilbert space. These spaces are covered by our negative results.
Moreover, since the mid-1980's many of the important theorems from the finite dimensional literature have been extended to exceptionally general infinite dimensional spaces, but for economies with a finite number of traders. This paper shows that it may not be possible to emulate that literature without adopting a different notion of aggregation than the Bochner integral and possibly sacrificing economic content.
The next section contains the notation, basic definitions, and some introductory results. Section 3 defines the notion of a Bochner economy and the notion of a Pettis economy.
Our counter examples are set-out as theorems in Sections 4 and 5, where we establish a more general result than the one we have already advertised. We show that existence of equilibrium, Core-equivalence, and the second theorem of welfare economics fail whenever the following holds.
There is a non-negligible coalition that is the union of a family of null sets smaller than dimension of the commodity space.
One implication of this result is that if the space of agents is atomless, then our counter example can be constructed in any vector space whose dimension is greater than or equal to c we define a vector ordering on the commodity space whose order topology is non-separable and Banachable; we then define an economy in this Banach space. That is, our example can be constructed whenever there are at least as many commodities as agents.
We note that our counter example is constructed using an arbitrary atomless measure space of agents, and thus includes Loeb measure spaces. It therefore may be possible to use``lifting'' arguments to infer from our negative theorems a negative result for large but finite economies (see Loeb [28] , Anderson [1] ).
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In Section 6 we explore ways of getting around the negative results of the previous section. We establish a close converse of the main result of Section 5. We list a theorem on the equivalence of the core and Walrasian allocations for Bochner as well as Pettis economies. We do this, however, by non-trivially strengthening Aumann's measurability assumption. The proof is in Section 9.
In Section 7 we discuss the relationship between Lyapunov's convexity theorem and the statements of the main theorems in Sections 5 and 6. Sections 10 and 11 contain concluding remarks and open questions.
PRELIMINARIES
We begin with some notation and definitions. We also list some known results, which we shall refer to later in the paper.
The set of all subsets of a set X, including the empty set, will be denoted 2 X . The cardinal number of a set X will be denoted card(X). The cardinal number assigned to the set of natural numbers is + 0 . The cardinal number assigned to the set of all real numbers is denoted by c. The product mn of cardinal numbers m and n is the cardinality of the set X_Y, where card(X)=m and card(Y)=n. For every cardinal number m, the number 2 m is defined as the cardinality of the family of all subsets of a set X satisfying card(X)=m. We define n m as the cardinality of the set of all functions from X to Y, where card(X)=m and card(Y)=n. We know that (n m 1 ) Let X be a topological space. The set of all cardinal numbers of the form card(B), where B is some base for the topology of X, is well ordered. This set has a smallest element, which is called the weight of the topological space, see Engelking [15, p. 12] . A second-countable space has weight + 0 .
Proposition 2.1. If X is a topological space with weight m, then X has a dense subset of cardinality m.
Proof. Let B be a base for the topology of X with card(B) m. Choose one point from each B # B. If Y is the collection of these points, then X=Y . K Let E be a topological vector space. Denote by E$ the topological dual of E and by E" the strong dual of E$. We use the notation ( p, x) to denote the value of p # E$ at x # E. Denote by dim(E) the dimension of the vector space E.
An ordered vector space is a vector space E that is ordered by an ordering which in addition to being reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric satisfies the following condition: for arbitrary z # E and real r>0,
The set [x # E : 0 x] is a convex cone with vertex 0, which is called the positive cone of E; and is denoted E + . A proper cone is a convex cone C with vertex 0 having the property C & &C= [0] . Each proper cone C E defines, by virtue of``x y'' if and only if``y&x # C '', an ordering on E under which E is an ordered vector space with positive cone E + =C. The space E is an ordered Banach space if it is a Banach space, an ordered vector space, and E + is norm closed. E is an ordered Hilbert space if it is a Hilbert space, an ordered vector space, and E + is norm closed.
Let E be an ordered vector space, we define the order topology T 0 of E to be the finest locally convex topology on E for which every order interval is bounded, (see Schaefer [41, p. 230] ). We shall use the notation [ } , } ] to denote order intervals. Proposition 2.2. Let (E, T) be an ordered Banach space. If the positive cone E + has a T-interior point e and [&e, e] is T-bounded, then T 0 =T.
Proof. The set [&e, e] is radial in E and absorbs order intervals. Thus, order intervals are T-bounded and T 0 is finer than T; since [&e, e] is a T-neighborhood of 0 and absorbs T-bounded sets, it follows that T 0 =T. K
We shall only consider measure spaces that are complete finite positive and non-trivial (i.e., if (T, {, +) is a measure space, then +(T )>0.) For the measure space (T, {, +), let S be an arbitrary subset of T and define the real number +*(S), called the outer measure of S, as follows
Let E be a Banach space. Following Diestel and Uhl [12] , a function f: T Ä E is simple if there are x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n in E and S 1 , S 2 , ..., S n in { such that
A function f : T Ä E is strongly +-measurable if there is a sequence of simple functions f n : T Ä E such that
We know from Pettis' measurability theorem, see Diestel and Uhl [12, Theorem II.1.2, p. 42], that f: T Ä E is strongly +-measurable if and only if it is weakly +-measurable and it is +-essentially separably valued, i.e., there is M # { with +(M)=0 such that [ f(t): t # T "M] is a norm separable subset of E. We shall also use the fact if f : A strongly +-measurable function f : T Ä E is Bochner integrable if there is a sequence of simple functions f n :
In this case, for each S # { we denote by S f (t) d+(t) the limit
where S f n (t) d+(t) is defined in the obvious way.
The relationship between two functions f and g on T into E, which is expressed by the statement f &g=0 +-a.e., is an equivalence relation. We let [ f ] be the class of functions equivalent to f and let L 1 (+, E) (or Bochner-L 1 (+, E)) denote the space of all equivalence classes of Bochner integrable functions on T into E. We shall occasionally speak of elements of L 1 (+, E) as if they were functions.
We use the fact that if p # E$ and f is integrable, then ( p, f (t)) is integrable and Bochner integration requires that integrable functions be strongly measurable. We turn to the more general Pettis integral, which allows us to integrate functions that may be only weakly measurable.
If f : T Ä E is weakly +-measurable and 
for each p # E$. In the case that x S # E for all S # {, the function f is called Pettis integrable and we write Pettis-| S f (t) d+(t)=x S to denote the Pettis integral of f over S # {.
Similarly
Finally, we introduce the idea of the``weight'' of a measure space.
Definition 2.3. Let (T, {, +) be a measure space, S T, and F {. Let O be the set of all cardinal numbers of the form card(K), where K is some collection [S k : k # K] of sets such that
If the set O is not empty, then it is well ordered for the usual partial ordering of cardinal numbers and has a smallest element, which we denote w(S, F, +).
The cardinal number w(S, F, +) depends on the collection of +-null sets in F. If w(S, F, +)=0, then S cannot be covered by any family of +-null sets in F. If w(S, F, +)=m>0, then S can be covered by a family of (no less than) m +-null sets in F. Also, if w(S, F, +)>0 and +(S)>0, then w(S, F, +)>+ 0 . Proposition 2.3. Let (T, {, +) be a measure space. If S T, F {, and w(S, F, +)=m>0, then S is the union of m disjoint non-empty +-null sets.
Proof. There is a collection [S k : k # K] of +-null sets in F such that card(K)=m and S k # K S k . Let < well order K, and denote by 0 the smallest element of K. Define a collection of sets inductively:
is the required collection of sets. K
THE BOCHNER AND THE PETTIS ECONOMIES
An economy (or a Bochner economy) E is a quintuple [E, (T, {, +), X, o, e], where E is the commodity space, which is an ordered Banach space, (T, {, +) is the measure space of agents, X: T Ä 2 E is the consumption correspondence, t [ o (t) X(t)_X(t) is the preference correspondence, and e: T Ä E is the initial endowments function, which is a Bochner integrable function satisfying e(t) # X(t) for all t # T.
For notational convenience, we shall denote any function x: T Ä E by t [ x t . In particular e t will denote e(t). Also, X t and o t will denote X(t) and o(t), respectively.
An allocation is a strongly +-measurable function t [
(t).
A coalition S is a measurable set S such that +(S)>0. A coalition S can improve upon an allocation t [ x t if there is an allocation t [ y t such that y t o t x t for every t # S, and S y t d+(t)= S e t d+(t). The set of all feasible allocations for the economy E that no coalition can improve upon is called the core of the economy. The set of all equivalence classes of functions in the core of E is denoted Boc-C(E).
A pair (t [ x t , ?), where t [ x t is a feasible allocation and ? # E$ + , is an equilibrium if for each t # T, (?, x t ) (?, e t ), and (?, y) >(?, e t ) if yo t x t ; +-a.e. The set of all equivalence classes of allocations t [ x t such that (t [ x t , ?) is an equilibrium for some ? is denoted Boc-W(E).
A Pettis economy E is a quintuple [E, (T, {, +), X, o, e], defined in exactly the same way as a Bochner economy except that the initial endowments function e: T Ä E is a Pettis integrable function.
A Pettis allocation is a weakly +-measurable function t [ x t # X t . A Pettis allocation t [ x t is a Pettis feasible allocation if
A coalition S can Pettis improve upon a Pettis allocation t [ x t if there is a Pettis allocation t [ y t such that y t o t x t for every t # S, and
The set of all Pettis feasible allocations for the economy E that no coalition can Pettis improve upon is called the Pettis core of the economy. The set of all equivalence classes of functions in the Pettis core of E is denoted Pet-C(E).
A pair (t [ x t , ?), where t [ x t is a Pettis feasible allocation and ? # E$ + , is a Pettis equilibrium if for each t # T, (?, x t ) (?, e t ), and (?, y) > (?, e t ) if y o t x t ; +-a.e. The set of all equivalence classes of Pettis allocations t [ x t such that (t [ x t , ?) is a Pettis equilibrium for some ? is denoted Pet-W(E).
Theorem 5.3, below, shows that Boc-C(E) is not always a subset of Pet-C(E), even when E is a Bochner economy. However, if E is a Bochner economy then the following statements hold:
1. E is a Pettis economy.
[Bochner-L
1 (+, E) & Pet-C(E)] Boc-C(E). 3. [Bochner-L 1 (+, E) & Pet-W(E)]=Boc-W(E).
If Boc-C(E) Boc-W(E), then Boc-C(E) Pet-C(E).
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We list the assumptions that are used in the statements of our negative results. The binary relation o t is called strictly monotone if
is measurable for any pair of allocations t [ x t and t [ y t .
A1.
1. \t # T, the initial endowment e t is an interior point of E + ; 2. \t # T, the consumption set X t =E + ; 3. \t # T, o t is induced from a norm-continuous, convex, strictly monotone, utility function.
A2. [ o t : t # T] is Aumann measurable.
NECESSITY OF AUMANN MEASURABILITY
We show that it is not possible to drop Aumann's measurability assumption and still hope to obtain Aumann's core Walras equivalence result (even in finite dimensional separable commodity spaces).
Theorem 4.1. Let E be an ordered Banach space that has at least two linearly independent strictly positive linear functionals, and whose positive cone has a non-empty interior. Each of statements 1 and 2 implies statement 3.
If E=[E, (T, {, +), } , } , } ], is a Bochner economy satisfying A1, then Boc-C(E) Boc-W(E).
If E=[E, (T, {, +), } , } , } ] is a Pettis economy satisfying A1, then Pet-C(E) Pet-W(E).
Every subset of T is +-measurable.
The non-existence of an atomless measure space (T, {, +) such that every subset of T is measurable is consistent with the usual assumptions of set theory including the axiom of choice see Federer [16, 
+(S).
If :=0 then let V*=V. If :>0 then choose a sequence : n A : such that : n <: for all n. For each n there is S n # {, S n V such that +(S n )>: n . The set V$= n S n V is measurable and for every n, +(V$)>: n . Thus, +(V$) :, which implies +(V$)=:.
The set V*=V"V$ is not measurable and is the required set. Else, if there is S # {, S V* with +(S)>0 then V$ _ S # {, V$ _ S V, and +(V$ _ S)>:. K Proof (Proof of Theorem 4.1). Suppose by way of contradiction that 1 O % 3 or that 2 O % 3. Then there is by Proposition 4.2 a non-measurable set V that does not contain any non-null measurable subsets.
Let g be an interior point of E + and let p and q be linearly independent strictly positive linear functionals on E such that ( p, g) =(q, g) =1.
We define a Bochner economy E=[E, (T, {, +), E + , o, e] that satisfies A1. Initial endowments are t [ e t = g, and utility functions are given as follows:
Since p{q and g is an interior point of E + , then t [ e t Â Boc-W(E) and
We show that t [ e t # Pet-C(E) and thus t [ e t # Boc-C(E). Suppose the contrary and that some coalition S # { (with +(S)>0) can Pettis improve upon t [ e t with a Pettis allocation f : T Ä E + such that
The set [t # S : ( p, f t ) 1] V is a null set, because it is a measurable subset of V. Therefore,
which contradicts Eq. (1). K
FAILURE IN LARGE COMMODITY SPACES
In this section, E will denote an arbitrary infinite dimensional vector space whose dimension is a regular cardinal number. We shall list a main proposition and several important consequences, the most important of which is Theorem 5.3. Proofs are given in Section 8.
The next proposition says that the existence of a coalition that is covered by dim(E) negligible sets implies the existence of an unpleasant Bochner economy that satisfies the very pleasant assumptions in A1 as well as Aumann's measurability assumption A2.
then there is an ordering on E, whose order topology T 0 is normable (with norm & } &) and complete, and an economy
satisfying A1 and A2 but
Boc-C(E) 3 Boc-W(E).
2. _ f # Boc-C(E) that can be Pettis improved upon by the coalition S. (ii) \t, e t is a T 0 -interior point of X ; but Boc-W(E )=<.
Pet-W(E){< and Pet-W(E ){<.
The next proposition tells us that every atomless measure space can be covered by c non-empty null sets. Proof. Let [S 0 , S 1 ] be a partition of T into two disjoint sets of equal measure. Inductively, if r is a finite string of 0s and 1s let [S r0 , S r1 ], be a partition of S r into two sets of equal measure.
Let K be the family of all countable sequences of 0's and 1s. For any natural number n>0 let k n be the first n elements of
is a disjointed family of sets whose union is T; thus w(T, {, +)>0. The union of the family 2. _ f # Boc-C(E) that can be Pettis improved upon by the coalition S.
Boc-W(E)=< and there is a truncation
E =[(E, & } &), (T, {, +), X , o, e] of E satisfying
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(i) \t, X t =X , which is a weakly compact and convex subset of E + ;
(ii) \t, e t is a T 0 -interior point of X ; but Boc-W(E )=<.
Pet-W(E){< and Pet-W(E ){<.
In Aumann [4, 5] the space of agents is the continuum [0, 1] with its Lebesgue measure, the proof of Proposition 5.1 betrays a stronger result for Hilbert commodity spaces. 
CORE-WALRAS EQUIVALENCE
In this section we present some interesting positive results. We begin with a list of the assumptions that are used in the statements of these results.
B1.
(T, {, +)
is an atomless measure space.
Pettis-T e t d+(t) is an interior point of
Let f be a function on T with values f t # X t . For each z # E define the set
We turn to the measurability assumption used in Hildenbrand [20] .
B2. For any allocation t [ f t and any z # E, the set A f z is measurable. We list a theorem and a corollary. The proof is given in Section 9. 
Equation (3) says that there is no non-negligible set of agents that can be covered by m null sets in F.
Every separable Banach space has weight + 0 . Also, every atomless measure space (T, {, +) satisfies Eq. (3) for m=+ 0 and F={. Thus, Theorem 6.1 implies Aumann's [4] result for the commodity space R n and the Rustichini and Yannelis [38, 40] results for separable ordered Banach spaces whose positive cones have interior points.
Corollary 6.1.1. Let E be a separable ordered Banach space. If E= [E, (T, {, +), X, o, e] satisfies B1 and B2, then Boc-C(E)=Boc-W(E).
LYAPUNOV'S CONVEXITY THEOREM
In this section we prove results on the relationship between Eqs. (2) and (3), of Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 6.1, respectively, and Lyapunov's convexity theorem in the weak topology.
Definition 7.1. Let E be a Banach space and let (T, {, +) be a measure space. Let G: { Ä E be a countably additive vector measure satisfying G(S & F )=0 for all F # { if and only if +(S)=0. Lyapunov's convexity theorem holds for the triplet ((T, {, +) The next theorem says that Lyapunov's convexity theorem holds whenever each coalition contains more distinguished sub-coalitions than commodities.
Theorem 7.1 (Rustichini and Yannelis [39] ). Let E, (T, {, +), and G be as in Definition 7.1. Assume that E is infinite dimensional. If (T, {, +) satisfies
then Lyapunov's convexity theorem holds for the triplet ((T, {, +), E, G). 
Suppose that Lyapunov's convexity theorem does not hold for the triplet ((T, {, +), E, G). There is some S # { with +(S)>0 and a one to one linear function from
If E is an infinite dimensional separable Banach space, then dim(E)=c. We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.1.1. Let E, (T, {, +), and G be as in Definition 7.1. Assume that E is separable and infinite dimensional. If (T, {, +) satisfies
then Lyapunov's convexity theorem holds for the triplet ((T, {, +), E, G).
The next result is an easy but interesting consequence of Proposition 2.3 and Theorem 7.1. Proof. Since t [ f t is a strongly +-measurable function, it is essentially separably valued. Therefore, there is M # {, +(M)=0, such that [ f t : t # T"M] is a norm separable subset of l 2 (A). Let H be a countable dense subset of this set.
From the definition of l 2 (A) we see that if
since the union of countably many sets of cardinality + 0 is a countable set. 
This proves the proposition. K
The Commodity Space
Let S* be the set from Eq. (2) of Proposition 5.l. That is, +(S*)>0, 0<w(S*, {, +) dim(E).
Since +(S*)>0 it must be the case that w(S*, {, +)>+ 0 only null sets are covered by countably many null sets. Since we assume the continuum hypothesis, it must be the case that w(S*, {, +) c. Therefore, letting m=dim(E) we see that m c. Let A be a set such that card(A)=m. We see from Proposition 8.1 that the space l 2 (A) has dimension m=dim(E). Thus, E is identical (up to algebraic isomorphism) to l 2 (A). Without loss of generality, identify the space E with l 2 (A).
We wish to construct an ordering on E whose order topology is the same as the canonical norm topology of l 2 (A).
By Proposition 2.3 the set S* is the union of a disjointed collection [S k *: k # K] of non-empty +-null sets with 0<card(K)<m. The index set K can be taken as though it were a proper subset of A since A is not finite. Fix % # A"K.
Let g % # l 2 (A) satisfy g % (%)=1 and g % (a)=0 for a # A" [%] . Let B denote the closed unit ball in l 2 (A). Let E + be the convex cone with vertex 0 generated by 3g % +B. That is E + = .
: 0 :(3g % +B).
It is easy to verify that E + is a norm closed convex proper cone. Also, g % is a norm interior point of E + and [&g % , g % ] is norm bounded. Thus, E + induces a vector ordering on l 2 (A) making it an ordered Banach space. By Proposition 2.2 the order topology T 0 of this ordering is the same as norm topology of l 2 (A). Endow E with the canonical norm of l 2 (A).
The Economy
For each t # T let the consumption set be E + ; i.e., X t =E + . For each t # T let the individual endowment be g % ; i.e., e t = g % . A1.1.-2. are satisfied.
Consider the set
For t # S k * let the utility function U t : E + Ä R be defined as
Intuitively, each agent in S k * extremely desires commodity % and the k-th commodity. For t # T "S* let
Evidently, U t is norm-continuous and convex for all t # T. We show that U t is strictly monotone with respect to the ordering induced by E + . For some k # K, take a fixed t # S k * and let f =(3g % +h) with &h& 1. We get
. Also, for t # T"S*, U t ( f )=3+h(%)>0. Since the functionals U t are linear then U t (E + "[0]) >0 and U t are strictly monotone with respect to the ordering induced by E + . A1.3. is satisfied.
Finally, we show that preferences satisfy Aumann's measurability assumption: S=[t # T : U t (x t )>U t ( y t )] is measurable for any pair of allocations t [ x t , t [ y t . By Proposition 8.2 there is a +-null set M such that the set
is countable. Consider the measurable sets F=[t: x t (%)> y t (%)] and G=[t:
That is, S=(F "N) _ O for some +-null sets N and O, which means that S is measurable. A2 is satisfied.
Items (1) (3)
We show that the feasible allocation t [ g % is in the core. Suppose otherwise. Then there is some allocation t [ f t , which is strongly measurable, and a measurable set S such that +(S)>0,
and U t ( f t )>U t ( g % )=1 for all t # S. Evidently, +(S & S*)>0 since the converse implies
which contradicts Eq. (9). Clearly, if t # S"S* then f t (%)>1. Thus the set S$=[t # (S & S*) : f t (%) 1] is measurable and +(S$)>0. Otherwise,
which contradicts Eq. (9). Since U t ( f t )>1 and f t (%) 1 for all t # S$ S* then
which contradicts Proposition 8.2. Now that we have shown that the allocation t [ g % is in Boc-C(E), we show that it is not in Boc-W(E) and that it can be Pettis improved upon by the coalition S*. Consider the function t [ f t ,
This function has values in E + for all 1>: 1&2Â(3 -5). Fix such an : and note
Take an arbitrary p # l 2 (A). Then ( p, g k ) =0 for all except countably many k # K. The first consequence of this is that if ( p, g % ) >0 then
From Eqs. (10) and (11) and monotonicity, we see that the allocation t [ g % is not in Boc-W(E). The second consequence is that t [ f t is weakly +-measurable and
From Eqs. (10) and (12) and monotonicity, the coalition S* can Pettis improve upon t [ g % .
Item (4)
Truncate the consumption sets
). This set is closed and bounded. Thus, it is weakly compact. We also see that e t # int X for each t # T. Thus, (i) (ii) of item (4) are satisfied.
Suppose that (t [ f t , p) is an equilibrium for this truncated economy. Let N be the +-null such that f t is a utility maximizer for each t # T "N.
For t # T "(S* _ N) we have f t (%) 1, for otherwise U t (e t ) U t ( f t ). Let S$=[t # S* : f t (%) 1]. Then as before +(S$)>0, since otherwise
which contradicts feasibility. The allocation t [ f t is strongly +-measurable. Thus, by Proposition 8.2 there is a +-null set M such that
Also, ( p, g k ) =0 for all but countably many k # K, and +(S$)>0. Thus, we can summarize
Thus, there is k # K that is an element of the set in Eq. (15) but that is not an element of the sets in Eqs. (13) and (14) . Pick t # (S$"(M _ N)) & S k *. Then, f t (%) 1, f t maximizes utility on agent t's budget set, f t (k)=0, and ( p, g k ) =0. It is easy to see that f t (%)=1, since the contrary implies U t (e t )>U t ( f t ).
Consider the point z=1Â2f t +1Â2e t , which is in int X . Then ( p, z) ( p, e t ) and for some 1>:>0, :z+(1&:) 2g k is also in int X . Since ( p, g k ) =0 and p>0 we get ( p, :z+(1&:) 2g k ) =( p, :z) ( p, z) ( p, e t ).
Also, U t (z)=U t ( f t ), since f t (k)=0 and f t (%)=1. Thus, U t (:z+(1&:) 2g k )=U t (:f t +(1&:) 2g k )=2+:( f t (%)&2)>1=U t ( f t ). (17) Equations (16) and (17) contradict the fact that f t maximizes utility on the budget set. So Boc-W(E )=< it is also easy to see that Boc-W(E)=<.
Item (5)
Consider the allocation t [ f t , which is defined as
It is easy to check that f t # X for all t. Since for each p # E$ we have ( p, g k ) =0 for all but countably many k then t [ f t is a Pettis feasible allocation. It is also easy to check that U t (x)>U t ( f t ) for some x # E + implies x(%)> f t (%). This is obviously the case for t # T "S*. For t # S k * (for some k) note that e t +:g k Â E + if :>1Â(2 -2). Thus, (t [ f t , g % ) is a Pettis equilibrium for E and E . 9. PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1
We adapt the classical argument used by Aumann [4] , see also Hildenbrand [20] . The proof for the Pettis economy follows with obvious changes that are identified in the footnotes.
Suppose that t [ f t is a feasible allocation in Boc-C(E).
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For each z # E let A f z =[t # T : z+e t o t f t ], which is in F and thus measurable.
property that the union of every sub-family of +-null sets with cardinality m is a +-null set. For example, the conditions in Corollaries 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 requiring that E or T have weight that is an Ulam number can be weakened if we restrict our attention to Radon or Loeb measures, see Ross [37] .
Remark 10.4. We can see from the proof of Proposition 5.1 that there is no free-disposal equilibrium for the truncated economy E , with or without positive prices. Furthermore, the positive results in Section 6 can be proved in the useful setting of a Banach lattice without order unit but with uniformly proper preferences, cf. Rustichini and Yannelis [38] .
Remark 10.5. In addition to the notion of a Pettis economy we can define a Gelfand-economy and a Dunford-economy by appropriately changing the method of integration. For the Dunford-economy we say a weakly measurable allocation f is feasible if f &e is Pettis integrable and Pettis-| T f (t)&e(t) d+(t)=0.
Note that f and e need not be Pettis integrable and hence their Dunfordintegral, if it exists, need not be in E.
Remark 10.6. We do not investigate whether core allocations can be approximately decentralized by prices. That is, whether core allocations of economies with sufficiently large (but finite) numbers of agents are approximately competitive. It appears that the finite dimensional results on approximate decentralizability of core allocations fail even in separable commodity spaces (see for instance [2] ). This indicates an entirely different syndrome to the failure of Core-Walras equivalence in non-separable spaces highlighted in the present paper. As noted in the introduction, however, our counter example is constructed using an arbitrary atomless measure space of agents, and thus includes Loeb measure spaces. It therefore may be possible to use``lifting'' arguments to infer from our negative theorems a negative result for large but finite economies.
OPEN QUESTIONS
Remark 11.1. The counter examples in Proposition 5.1 are constructed using a non-separable ordered Hilbert commodity space with order unit. Can we view the construction in Proposition 5.1 as a concrete version of the proof of a more general result. One that characterizes a class of Banach spaces as those spaces in which Bochner existence and Bochner Core-Walras equivalence hold. 21 This important question remains open. Curiously, Proposition 5.1, and the examples in Khan and Rustichini [21] , appear to crucially require the existence of a Pettis integrable function f which is everywhere non-zero but for which Pettis-S f (s) d+(t)=0 for every S # {, see also Remark 10. 
